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Climate change will increasingly create severe risks for  
New Zealand’s coastal housing stock. Even a small amount 
of sea level rise will substantially exacerbate the costs of 
flooding and storm surges (Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment, 2015). Under the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) three mitigation scenarios, 
global average sea levels are likely to rise by between 28cm 
and 73cm by 2100 (above the 1986–2005 average). Under the 
IPCC’s high emissions scenario the sea level is likely to rise by 
between 52cm and 98cm by 2100 (IPCC, 2013). Only collapse 
of parts of the Antarctic ice sheet, if triggered, could cause the 
sea level to rise substantially above these ranges. Some regions 
in New Zealand (including the main urban centres) have high 
enough quality geographic data to infer the number of homes 
at risk. In those regions, there are over 43,000 homes within 
1.5m of the present average spring high tide and over 8,000 
within 50cm (Bell, Paulik and Wadwha, 2015).
In the best of all possible worlds New 
Zealand would face far fewer risks from 
climate change. Sound science would 
communicate future risk, which would be 
understood by all decision makers. These 
decision makers would make socially 
optimal decisions and would coordinate 
across all levels and parts of government. 
Existing homeowners would take risk into 
account when making housing investment 
decisions. Home buyers would take risk 
into account when purchasing, and this 
would affect both what they purchase 
and how much they are willing to pay. 
Developers would take future and current 
climate risk into account in siting and 
designing developments. Insurers would 
pool the residual risk across individuals, 
and would obtain affordable reinsurance 
in international markets. Councils would 
credibly commit to an adaptive decision-
making approach for land use and 
building decisions and would continue to 
adjust this approach as the climate, and 
sea level, change. Alas, we do not live in 
this Panglossian dream.
In reality, there is limited information 
about how climate risks will change over 
time and the information that is available 
is often not accessible to the layperson. 
Belinda Storey is a doctoral student in economics at Victoria University of Wellington. Ilan Noy holds 
the inaugural Chair in the Economics of Disasters at Victoria University of Wellington.
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 4 – November 2017 – Page 69
Even with good information, people often 
make poor decisions under different types 
of uncertainty: they overreact to small 
threats, easily forget previously observed 
loss, and exhibit optimism bias when risks 
are high. They often discount future 
events heavily and do not plan well for 
them.1 These same obstacles and barriers 
faced by homeowners and renters also 
afflict, of course, policymakers, and the 
employees of private sector entities 
involved in residential housing, such as 
banks and insurers.
When coastal disasters occur, 
homeowners experience significant losses 
and displacement. Some may be forced to 
permanently leave their community after 
a single and sudden-onset disaster like a 
storm surge, flash flood or landslide, or 
following a series of smaller events that 
accumulate to large losses (Moftakhari et 
al., 2017). Property developers and 
existing homeowners may seek to block 
the transmission of information about 
risk to potential home buyers. Local and 
central government may face high costs 
from protective measures and continued 
provision of infrastructure when 
abandoning housing may be more 
efficient. Local authorities, and their 
insurers, may find themselves holding 
unexpected liabilities if future courts rule 
that councils are liable for resource 
consents provided to homes threatened 
by climate change. All this may happen, 
and almost surely will.
Climate change will render some 
currently inhabited locations 
uninhabitable. This transition could well 
be costly for individuals and their 
communities. It is not yet known how 
many locations will face this transition 
over the next few decades. Many of the 
costs considered in this article will be 
accrued in the more distant future. The 
traditional use of government discount 
rates might portray such costs several 
decades from now as innocuous. Heavily 
discounting the future losses from past 
and present actions is generally 
inappropriate, however, especially when 
those harmed will be uncompensated 
(Cowen and Parfit, 1992; Stern, 2015). 
Moreover, discounting is incongruous 
with the emphasis within mätauranga 
Mäori on safeguarding treasures that have 
been passed down by past generations 
(Awatere, 2008). The assets which will be 
exposed to climate change decades hence 
are being built now, so the far-reaching 
consequences of current decisions should 
be reflected in current policy (Stephens, 
Bell and Lawrence, 2017).
Here, we focus on how escalating 
coastal housing risks induced by sea level 
rise, coastal storms and extreme 
precipitation will affect the future 
availability of insurance in New Zealand. 
Insurance does not reduce risk. Instead, 
insurance allows one party (the insured) 
to transfer some of its risk to another 
party (the insurer) through a financial 
contract which compensates the insurer 
for the receipt of the transferred risk. 
Evidence from international markets 
suggests that when a risk is perceived to 
have increased and become unprofitable 
to transfer, insurance companies classify 
affected areas as ‘uninsurable’ and 
withdraw insurance altogether. The New 
Zealand government plays a major role in 
the provision of some natural disaster 
insurance through the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC). Several other 
features differentiate the New Zealand 
residential property insurance sector from 
those in other countries. First, New 
Zealand has mostly international insurers 
in the local market. Second, disaster 
insurance take-up is unusually high 
(probably around 90-95%), because it is 
automatically attached to fire insurance. 
Third, prudential regulation of New 
Zealand insurers is quite recent and does 
not constrain the product categories in 
which an insurer may operate (Dean, 
2010). Fourth, the New Zealand insurance 
industry has historically offered all-perils 
coverage, including major natural hazards 
such as earthquakes and floods that are 
often excluded elsewhere.
Other institutions are also used to 
manage risk. The New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement 2010, established under 
the Resource Management Act (RMA), is 
the overarching planning document 
regarding New Zealand’s coasts along 
with part 2 matters in the RMA. Each 
regional council is required to prepare a 
regional coastal policy statement which 
outlines how, among other matters, the 
regional council addresses management 
of natural hazards (including climate 
change) and must give effect to the 
national policy. The New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement states that a pre-
cautionary approach should be adopted 
to resource use and development in 
coastal environments wherever the effects 
of activities ‘are uncertain, unknown, or 
little understood, but potentially 
significantly adverse’ (policy 3). It 
highlights climate change as a particularly 
important source of vulnerability for 
coastal resources and outlines policies for 
identifying and managing coastal hazards, 
including the effects of climate change 
(policies 24–27) (Department of 
Conservation, 2010). Local councils are 
responsible for managing risk insofar as 
they construct infrastructure and make 
planning decisions which affect exposure 
to coastal hazards.
Issues with pricing climate-sensitive 
insurance 
Climate change may make the calculation 
of actuarially precise premiums more 
difficult as changes to hazard frequency 
and intensity render historical data 
less relevant. In recent decades most of 
the increase in global coastal risk has 
Climate change may make the 
calculation of actuarially precise 
premiums more difficult as changes to 
hazard frequency and intensity render 
historical data less relevant. 
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come from increased exposure through 
urbanisation and economic development 
(McGranahan, Balk and Anderson, 2007). 
However, as the sea level rises at faster 
rates, and storms intensify, changes in 
hazards are expected to replace changes 
in exposure as the primary driver of 
escalating coastal risks (Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2015).  
As the global sea level rises, king tides, 
storm surges and waves will reach further 
inland. Research commissioned by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment has demonstrated that even 
modest increases in the sea level will 
dramatically reduce the return period of 
major events. For example, with a 10cm 
sea level rise the return period for a one-
in-100-year storm surge in Wellington 
will reduce by a factor of five to a return 
period of one in 20 years. Once the sea 
level has risen by 30cm, a one-in-100-year 
event is expected to become an annual 
event in Christchurch and Wellington. 
The global sea level is projected to rise by 
between 17 and 38cm by 2065 (IPCC, 
2013).
The resolution of climate models is 
such that it is difficult to predict even large 
events such as tropical cyclones (Roberts, 
Colle and Korfe, 2017; Walsh et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, most climate models predict 
that while the number of tropical cyclones 
in the South Pacific will reduce slightly, 
the proportion of tropical cyclones that 
reach category 4 and 5 will increase and 
the path of tropical cyclones will move 
poleward (Holland and Bruyere, 2014; 
Kossin, Emanuel and Vecchi, 2014; 
Munich Re, 2016; Ramsay, Camargo and 
Daehyun, 2014; Woodruff, Irish and 
Camargo, 2013). This could increase the 
probability that a tropical cyclone 
undergoes an extratropical transition that 
results in a large storm surge in Auckland 
or Tauranga, where many exposed homes 
and businesses are located. 
Accurate estimates of future coastal 
hazards are further limited by deep 
uncertainties around polar ice sheet 
response and future global emission 
pathways, the high collection cost of up-
to-date high-resolution land elevation 
and asset data sets, and the limited 
precision of risk models for extreme 
events and their actuarial counterparts.
The price New Zealand pays for 
reinsurance in global financial markets is 
an important determinant of the retail 
cost of insurance. If international 
reinsurance markets harden – currently 
they are facing historically low costs of 
financing – the reinsurance premiums 
paid by EQC and New Zealand’s private 
insurers could significantly rise. Since 
New Zealand catastrophic risk is 
uncorrelated with other markets, 
reinsurers are more likely to raise prices 
than to leave the New Zealand market 
altogether, but reinsurers may ultimately 
withdraw cover for some perils, such as 
storm surges or earthquakes. 
Demand for residential insurance
Even risk-averse individuals tend to 
underestimate risk, particularly low-
probability, high-impact risk (Kousky, 
Michel-Kerjan and Raschky, 2017; 
Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004; McClelland, 
Schulze and Coursey, 1993). Demand for 
insurance often increases immediately 
following a catastrophic event (Browne 
and Hoyt, 2000; Michel-Kerjan and 
Kousky, 2010), but returns to modest 
levels within a few years (Gallagher, 2014). 
In locations that have not experienced an 
event for a number of years, or where the 
average household tenure at that location 
is short, the demand for catastrophic 
insurance is likely to be subdued. 
International studies have found that 
the demand for insurance cover for 
catastrophic events is more price sensitive 
than for insurance for non-catastrophic 
events (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; 
Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 2004). 
When insurance premiums for low-
probability events rise in price, individuals 
may stop insuring or may under-insure, 
even when those premiums are subsidised 
below their true actuarial cost (Dixon at 
el., 2006; Petrolia, Landry and Coble, 
2013). Those with lower incomes are 
somewhat less likely to buy catastrophic 
insurance than those with higher incomes 
(Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 2004).
The combined effect of price and 
income means that as insurance premiums 
consume a greater proportion of 
disposable income, homeowners are less 
likely to retain insurance (Landry and 
Jahan-Parvar, 2011) and demand for 
insurance falls faster for lower-probability, 
high-impact risk (i.e. the risk from 
catastrophic events) than it does for 
higher-probability, low-impact risk (i.e. 
frequent nuisance events) (Grace, Klein 
and Kleindorfer, 2004). In other words, if 
the AEP (annual exceedance probability) 
of an event doubles from 0.5% to 1% (i.e. 
if a one-in-200-year event becomes a one-
in-100-year event), insurance demand is 
likely to fall by a greater amount than if 
the AEP doubles from 2% to 4% (i.e. if a 
one-in-50-year event becomes a one-in-
25-year event). 
The Household Economic Survey 
conducted by Statistics New Zealand 
suggests that average household 
expenditure on building insurance has 
almost doubled since the first Canterbury 
earthquake in 2010, from $540 in 2010 to 
$1,051 in 2015 (New Zealand Treasury, 
2017). This includes the 2012 increase in 
EQC premium rates from 5 cents to 15 
cents per $100 cover, but not the 
November 2017 increase to 20 cents. As 
insurance premiums take up a larger 
proportion of disposable income, more 
low-income households are likely to 
under-insure or allow their insurance 
policies to lapse.
International experience suggests that 
in the absence of an EQC-type scheme, 
most homeowners do not insure against 
natural hazards and governments are 
compelled by public pressure to provide 
ad hoc assistance 
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Homeowners may not purchase 
insurance if they believe that they will be 
compensated by government. 
International experience suggests that in 
the absence of an EQC-type scheme, most 
homeowners do not insure against natural 
hazards and governments are compelled 
by public pressure to provide ad hoc 
assistance (Kousky, Michel-Kerjan and 
Raschky, 2017; Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan, 2014). This may encourage 
homeowners to avoid insurance, thereby 
increasing the future fiscal risk for 
government if it is induced to provide 
compensation (Raschky and Weck-
Hannemann, 2007; Raschky et al., 2013).
Following the Canterbury earthquakes, 
the government did not assist homeowners 
who had not purchased insurance except 
where it was compelled to do so for 
property that was red-zoned.2 Any public 
objection to that decision was muted, as 
the number of people who reportedly did 
not have insurance was very small. Public 
objection and government response after 
a climate change-related disaster may be 
very different if the number of uninsured 
properties is higher where insurance had 
previously been prohibitively priced for 
affected communities, or if the event is 
perceived to be at least partially a 
consequence of government failure.
Case study: Edgecumbe and Cyclone Debbie
In general, in the immediate aftermath 
of natural disasters public officials 
face intense pressure to offer support, 
particularly to those households and 
businesses that for whatever reason 
are not insured (Boston and Lawrence, 
2017). Public support for ad hoc 
assistance is bolstered by media coverage 
of natural disasters and can reinforce 
expectations that relief will be offered in 
similar situations in the future (Seifert 
et al., 2013). For example, immediately 
following the Edgecumbe floods caused 
by extratropical Cyclone Debbie in 
2017, the prime minister, Bill English, 
acknowledged that ‘there’s probably going 
to be people there who aren’t insured or 
for whom it’s had a huge impact’ and 
suggested that public assistance would be 
offered to households to work through 
‘their immediate issues and then if the 
long-term one is lack of insurance then 
we’ll have to deal with that then’ (Radio 
New Zealand, 2017). The government 
also offered a $700,000 support package 
to approximately 100 affected businesses 
(Morton, 2017), thereby creating a 
disincentive for businesses to purchase 
business continuity insurance for future 
events.
Public supply of residential insurance
The government believes it is important 
to help private property owners avoid 
‘socially unacceptable distress and loss 
in the event of a natural disaster’ (New 
Zealand Treasury, 2015). EQC has helped 
ensure greater insurance penetration in 
New Zealand so that homeowners have a 
much higher take-up rate of catastrophe 
insurance than is the case in other 
countries (New Zealand Treasury, 2015). 
EQC protects private residential 
property and contents from damage by 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, 
hydrothermal activity, landslip, tsunami, 
or fire caused by natural disaster. EQC 
land cover extends the range of perils to 
include storm and flood hazards, but 
excludes coastal erosion. EQC does not 
cover damage to residential structures or 
contents from storm or floods (or coastal 
erosion).
EQC premiums are collected by 
private insurance companies and are 
embedded within residential insurance 
policies that include fire insurance. 
Consequently, if private insurers withdraw 
from certain markets, homeowners would 
need to apply directly to EQC for cover. It 
is not clear how many homeowners would 
seek to do so and what administrative 
demands this would place on EQC and on 
its interactions with the private insurance 
sector. Retreat by private insurers from 
particular locations could increase the 
unfunded fiscal risk to the Crown 
associated with private property in natural 
disasters, should the Crown elect to 
provide relief to uninsured homeowners 
(ibid.). 
Applying a standard (flat) EQC 
premium price nationwide helps spread 
the risk faced in more hazardous locations 
across all policy holders. This makes 
catastrophe insurance affordable for those 
who are most exposed and helps ensure 
high insurance penetration. In doing so, 
however, it also mutes the price signal 
which otherwise may discourage or shape 
development in more hazardous locations.
The nature of EQC land cover is 
currently being reconsidered as part of the 
review of the Earthquake Commission 
Act 1993. There is, apparently, no current 
proposal to remove EQC’s land cover for 
storms or floods (ibid.).3 
In May 2017 the New Zealand 
government announced an increase to 
EQC’s premiums (also known as the EQC 
levy), effective from 1 November 2017 
(EQC, 2017). This increase was designed 
to ensure that the premiums paid by 
homeowners reflected EQC’s long-term 
costs, including expected future losses 
from natural hazards. Historically, 85% of 
EQC’s historical land claims have been 
less than $20,000 (New Zealand Treasury, 
2015). Recent analysis commissioned by 
EQC assumes that the expected losses for 
EQC’s land cover – for all perils – will 
remain less than 10% of EQC’s total 
EQC does not protect against erosion 
caused by slow-onset events or rising 
seas, but the courts may hold EQC liable 
for land loss caused by storms – many 
of which will be more destructive with 
sea level rise and changes in extreme 
precipitation.
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average annual loss (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2017). 
Except for severe liquefaction and 
major landslides, land damage from 
geological hazards can usually be 
remediated: volcanic ash can be removed 
and buckled earth can be levelled. EQC 
does not protect against erosion caused by 
slow-onset events or rising seas, but the 
courts may hold EQC liable for land loss 
caused by storms – many of which will be 
more destructive with sea level rise and 
changes in extreme precipitation. When 
land disappears with storm surges or flash 
floods, full compensation may be required. 
Given the rising value of coastal and 
riparian land, EQC’s exposure could 
become orders of magnitude greater than 
historical averages. 
Private supply of residential insurance
Insurance covers risks for which there is 
significant uncertainty. As such, insurers 
will retreat from coastal and riparian 
locations once risks are sufficiently 
probable. Insurers may retreat from a 
coastal or riparian area of New Zealand 
following a climate event in that location 
or in another New Zealand location. 
Alternatively, they may retreat after their 
experience in another country convinces 
them that risk profiles have changed 
because of sea level rise or other climatic 
changes. Insurance retreat from coastal 
and riparian locations could increase the 
unfunded fiscal risk faced by the Crown 
and decrease house prices as mortgages 
become unavailable (or more costly).
Insurers may be more willing to 
continue to provide insurance to high-
risk areas if they decide to discriminate 
between these areas and lower-risk ones in 
the policies they offer (in premium prices, 
in excesses or in policy wording). Pressure 
to differentiate is likely to increase as the 
cost of estimating individual risk falls 
with higher-resolution climate models, 
advanced data aggregation and analysis 
(‘big data’) and the expansion of geodata 
such as LiDAR. Policy discrimination in 
New Zealand is uncommon and has 
historically taken the form of higher 
excesses rather than higher premiums, but 
this could change.
Impact of insurance retreat on mortgage 
availability and cost 
Insurance is a requirement for residential 
mortgages in New Zealand and failing to 
maintain insurance can trigger ‘technical’ 
default. The possibility of default is 
exacerbated by maturity mismatches 
between residential insurance and 
mortgages. While mortgages are often 
granted with repayment periods spanning 
decades, insurance contracts are renewed 
annually. Insurers are thus able to leave 
an insurance market within 12 months, 
while it may be a decade or more before 
lenders’ loans mature. As a consequence, 
in the future, bankers may lend to owners 
of coastal property less often, require 
more equity as collateral, or offer shorter 
mortgage terms (Lawrence et al., 2016). 
Even now, and despite their rules requiring 
mortgagors to insure, the general absence 
of compliance checks means that banks 
do not currently know whether particular 
properties they mortgage remain insured 
beyond the first year of ownership.
Commercial insurance 
The same problems and trends that we 
described for insurance for residential 
buildings and contents4 also apply to 
commercial ones; though commercial 
cover responds to these pressures 
even faster. In New Zealand, since the 
1993 Earthquake Commission Act, 
commercial properties are insured only 
by the private sector insurers. Without 
the involvement of the public insurer 
(EQC), the response of commercial policy 
premiums to the Canterbury earthquakes 
was more dramatic. The loss of cover for 
earthquake-prone buildings was more 
acute in the non-residential sector. It is 
also likely that some of the other factors 
that might be dampening the expected 
increases in premiums on individual 
residential properties do not apply in the 
commercial sector, where the full explicit 
and implicit risk is borne by the insurers. 
For commercial properties, insurance 
plays an additional, socially beneficial role 
by allowing entrepreneurs and small and 
medium-size businesses to transfer some 
of the risks they incur, thus facilitating 
more investment in future activities and 
growth. The vast majority of businesses in 
New Zealand are small, so this risk-
transfer role for insurance is potentially 
very important (though as yet 
unquantified). Similarly, business 
continuity insurance contracts are often 
tied to property insurance, so the potential 
withdrawal of commercial property 
insurance will impose cascading barriers 
on the operations of small and medium-
size commercial entities.
Looking ahead
The landscape for insurance demand and 
supply is already changing. Insurers are 
gradually moving away from the New 
Zealand practice of all-peril policies. They 
are offering different types of maximum 
cover for different hazards, even though 
this adds complexity to insurance 
contracts. This may lower demand for 
disaster insurance from homeowners. A 
requirement that insurers provide a non-
technical explanation of the key elements 
of the insurance policy on a single page 
could support homeowners’ decision 
making. Reforms of consumer finance 
in the United States following the global 
financial crisis, such as the Credit CARD 
Act of 2009, provide an example of this 
type of requirement. A breakdown of the 
cost component for each category of risk 
– for example, how much of an insurance 
premium price covers the risk of fire 
as opposed to the risk of floods at that 
As insurance retreats from particular 
locations, house prices in those 
areas are likely to be affected and 
infrastructure investments may be more 
difficult to justify.
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location – could strengthen the signalling 
effect of insurance. From experience with 
other policies – for example, mandatory 
pricing of plastic bags – we know that 
even very modest pricing signals can have 
a material impact on behaviour. 
 As hazards become more likely, and 
particularly for homes experiencing 
repeat events, insurers are also transferring 
some risk back onto homeowners by 
requiring very high excesses. Insurers are 
already withdrawing from some 
individual flood- and earthquake-prone 
properties. Policymakers are limited in 
their ability to determine the extent of this 
problem, as private insurers do not 
disclose their commercial decisions 
regarding insurance availability. As 
climate hazards escalate, these trends will 
accelerate. In some jurisdictions, the 
insurance regulator collects information 
from insurers on insurance coverage (Plitt 
and Maldonado, 2012). Aggregated data 
from insurers on key contractual terms, 
including premium pricing and excess 
levels, and expected and actual losses, as 
well as notification of withdrawal of 
coverage from particular locations, could 
be very useful for policymakers in 
assessing emerging risks.
Insurance, which has long contributed 
to the financial security of homeowners 
and supported economic growth, will 
become less available. As insurance 
retreats from particular locations, house 
prices in those areas are likely to be 
affected and infrastructure investments 
may be more difficult to justify. Since 
insurance companies are unlikely to 
commit to long-term insurance contracts, 
local and central governments will need to 
commission their own analysis of the 
potential timing and scale of insurance 
retreat from locations affected by climate 
change hazards. 
Furthermore, the New Zealand 
government’s fiscal exposure will expand 
as the government faces ever greater 
pressure to respond to climate disasters 
with financial assistance and other post-
event recovery support programmes. 
Creation of innovative funding 
instruments that support pre-event 
adaptation measures that enhance societal 
resilience and reduce risk could lessen 
these claims on central and local 
government when disasters occur (Boston 
and Lawrence, 2017).
Since climate change will render some 
currently inhabitable locations 
uninhabitable, policy interventions in the 
insurance market can only achieve so 
much. Projections of probable insurance 
retreat could serve as the canary in the 
coal mine, and inform decisions to 
gradually withdraw residential properties 
from those locations most at risk from 
climate change.
1 Economists, with their talent for esoteric terminology, call 
this myopia ‘hyperbolic discounting’.
2 Quake Outcasts v the minister of Canterbury earthquake 
recovery [2017], NZCA 332 (1 August 2017).
3 EQC land liability is the smallest of: the area of the insured 
land that is damaged; the minimum-sized area allowed for 
use of a residential site under the relevant district plan; the 
value of the 4,000m2 closest to the dwelling (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2015).
4 Note: since private insurers do not provide cover for land 
damage, and EQC does not provide cover for commercial 
properties, no insurance is available for land damage on 
commercial properties.
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Festive greetings from the School of Government
The School of Government would 
like to extend our sincere thanks 
and good wishes to all those who 
had contact with the School during 
2017, with particular 
acknowledgement of our 2017 
graduands and prize-winners.
We wish you all a happy and restful 
festive season and look forward to 
working with you all again in 2018.
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